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ABSTRACT Real-world experiments that test new technologies can affect policy 
and practice by introducing new objects of intervention through tinkering; the 
ad hoc work of realigning relations in the face of frictions, surprises, and 
disturbances that occur when introducing a technology. In a pilot study on 
aggression detection, tinkering moved aggression in and out of the human 
body. In the end, the pilot study constituted aggression as a set of acoustic-
physical variables representing the aroused human body, alongside other 
signals of aggression. How aggression as an object intervention was 
established by tinkering is relevant because it involved inclusions and 
exclusions by the authorities who identified aggression, the methods they 
applied, and mandate for intervention. A focus on relations that are tinkered 
with in a real-world experiment permits critical engagement with this format. 
Although the format of experimenting outside of the laboratory is credited with 
producing knowledge about a technology’s ‘actual’ performance, actors and 
events at the pilot study location were made only selectively relevant. Analyses 
of real-world experiments should therefore explain how experiments 
selectively make the world relevant, giving only particular objects of 
intervention a truth status. 
 
 






In 2010 and 2011, Bus Station S in a large Dutch city was the site of a pilot study on 
the acoustic detection of aggression.1 The technology used alerted a nearby police 
station if a person sounded aggressive. This experiment appears to elucidate some key 
issues surrounding experiments with technology in operational settings. In the 
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academic literature, such efforts are referred to as real-world experiments, policy 
experiments, or regulatory experiments. 
 As noted in the Netherlands and other European and Anglo-American 
countries, an experimental attitude has become an integrated part of crime control.2 
Science and technology thus play important roles in this changing field. Not only are 
knowledge and technologies produced and tested, scientific activity may also affect 
policing practices by shaping its objects of intervention, such as crime and aggression. 
Nikolas Rose suggests this when he argues that biocriminology has framed crime as 
an ‘epidemic of anti-social, aggressive, and violent conduct that is thought to arise 
from a diminution of self-control, reasonableness, maturity, judgment, tact, and 
reasoning’ (2000, p. 18l; also see Vrecko, 2009). Standing at the intersection of 
science and practice, real-world experiments can thus shape objects of intervention by 
introducing technologies to operational sites. When this happens, ethical and practical 
concerns may be set aside to maintain an advantage over potential lawbreakers, as the 
experimental attitude implies (Koops, 2011). 
In this article, I seek to learn more about the operation of real-world 
experiments based on a case study on an aggression detection pilot. In the pilot study, 
microphones recorded sounds at Bus Station S, which were analyzed for indicators of 
aggression. Early detection, the city’s Department for Community Safety argued, 
could prevent violence. For the city’s policymakers, the pilot study was mainly a 
means to discover whether this technology could help lower the number of violent 
incidents and improve bus drivers’ perceptions of personal security. 
The case opened up a set of very different issues as well. Aggression detection 
introduced acoustic aggression as a new object of police intervention. Yet, we should 
not forget that in most criminal codes, it is not forbidden to act or talk ‘aggressively’, 
although violence and insult can be offenses. At stake were the emotions one is 
allowed to express in public space, the authorities deciding over this, the mandate for 
intervention, and the method of intervention. In other words, the introduction of 
aggression detection includes experimenting with the legitimate use of force, a central 
principle of the constitutional state. 
The objective of this article is to examine how an object of intervention attains 
its nature and status through experimentation. How is aggression constituted in the 
pilot study on Bus Station S? 
Answering this question also serves a secondary, more general, objective: to 
critically engage with the format of testing at an operational site. This is relevant 
because the used pilot study format is increasingly credited with the production of 
knowledge that reflects the ‘actual’ performance of a technology. The core of the real-
world method is to obtain knowledge that is not available in the controlled world of 
the laboratory (Krohn and Weyer, 1994). Yet, we may assume that some actors and 
events in the world outside the laboratory will be made more relevant to the outcomes 
than others. The question remains: which actors and events are included, and which 
are excluded? 
I draw on ethnographic fieldwork that I conducted during the pilot. The city 
administration kindly allowed me to observe the pilot study for 22 months and study 
project documents. As part of my fieldwork, I conducted interviews with 
policymakers, police officers, a bus company staff member, and corporate 
researchers. My observations include project meetings, Community Safety meetings, 
a site visit to the technology supplier, observations of patrol officers, and of police 
control room practices. 
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 To understand the kind of object and how it was introduced in the pilot study, 
I draw on insights from material semiotics and science and technology studies (STS). 
This is a relational approach to the activity of experimenting. Experiments do not 
simply test new technologies, it argues, but require the realignment of relations 
between actors of various kinds, such as humans, tools, and bodies of knowledge 
(Latour, 1996). It is through this trial-and-error process that new objects of 
intervention take shape. I introduce the notion of tinkering (Knorr, 1979; Knorr-
Cetina 1989) to the literature on real-world experiments to provide an insight into 
these ad hoc rearrangements. 
 The article shows how the technology, crime control, and acoustic spaces were 
tinkered with at three pilot sites: the engineer’s room at Analytics Inc., the developer 
and supplier of aggression detection technologies; the city’s Department of 
Community Safety; and the police control room that observed Bus Station S. A new 
signal of aggression was introduced to policing practices: shouts produced by the 
aroused and possibly violent human body. This signal did not replace the existing 
signals of aggression at the sites of practice. Instead, aggression as a bodily 
phenomenon was established as a fact to be detected in less noisy environments. The 
pilot study therefore introduced a norm for behavior not prescribed by criminal law, 
but by a set of acoustic-physical variables taken to represent a bodily state. 
 Through a relational approach, it thus becomes possible to study the nature of 
the new objects that real-world experiments introduce; who determines what they are, 
by which method, and what or who is excluded. We learn that experimenters make the 
test location selectively relevant. In this case, the pilot study location was made to 
represent a ‘real world’ that was disturbing and uncontrollable, invalidating it as a 
proper site for a test of technology. Thus the overarching contribution of a relational 
approach to real-world experimentation is that what counts as the real world should 
not be taken for granted, but is an outcome of the experiment. 
 
 
Experimenting at the Intersections of Practice, Policy, and Research 
 
The Real-World Experiment 
 
The literature on real-world experiments has increasingly recognized that experiments 
performed in operational settings rearrange existing practices. Yet this body of work 
does not fully conceptualize how these rearrangements come about and to what effect. 
After discussing the current main insights into real-world experiments, I introduce 
two concepts that guide my empirical analysis: objects of intervention and tinkering. 
Various authors in the social studies of science recognize that experimentation 
has become an institutionalized form of decision making, where policymakers and 
practitioners are confronted with the possibilities and uncertainties of new 
technologies (Gross and Krohn, 2005). This is different than attempting to learn from 
events that happen anyway, as is the case with the use of high-risk technologies such 
as nuclear power plants (cf. Krohn and Weingart, 1987); different than referring to 
policy as experimental because it allows for incremental innovation (cf. Dorf and 
Sabel, 1998); and different than stating that society-at-large is a laboratory to allude to 
the ways in which actors innovate, take risks, and cross pre-determined boundaries 
(Guggenheim, 2012). Such practices have been noted as examples of experimentation 
with good reason. Yet, my concern is with the practice of experimenting technology 
in policy and operational settings according to such formats as pilot studies and 
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technology trials (Gross and Krohn, 2005). I am especially interested in such formats 
because they are increasingly accepted as knowledge production methods for policy. 
 I follow Matthias Gross and Wolfgang Krohn in identifying these deliberate, 
institutionalized forms as ‘real-world experiments’ (Gross and Krohn, 2005), 
previously referred to as ‘real-life experiments’ (Krohn and Weyer, 1994). These 
notions were developed in the context of knowledge society theory. In Krohn’s work, 
the idea of the knowledge society expresses the increasing level of uncertainty about 
risk as a consequence of today’s fast pace of innovation. Taking waste as an example 
of the unpredictability of the risks of new knowledge and technology, he shows how 
real-world experiments in waste management meet policy’s need to reduce these 
uncertainties (Krohn, 2007). Gross argues that contemporary modes of knowledge 
production – problem-oriented and interdisciplinary – lead to more uncertainty. As 
researchers engage with the world outside the laboratory, they confront not always 
welcome surprises. Drawing lessons from ecological design, Gross argues that 
experimentation should be developed as a method ‘not to overcome or control 
unknowns, but to live and blossom with them’ (Gross, 2010, p. 45). 
 Although their setups differ wildly, many experimental forms have in common 
that they at least presuppose an organized research process that includes monitoring 
and evaluation (Krohn and Van den Daele, 1998). They cross institutional boundaries, 
involving policymakers and regulators as well as scientists, corporate researchers, and 
operational employees. Importantly, testing is based on the idea that the particularities 
of the site of implementation will reveal information about the employment of a 
technology that otherwise would not be available (Krohn, 2007). This is because the 
interactions between a technology, nature, and society are unstable, site-specific, 
complex, and unpredictable (Gross, 2010). The insights that pilot studies and similar 
formats are to deliver concern such topics as public perception, interoperability, 
relevant tacit knowledges, and health risks. 
 This body of literature also observes that real-world experiments cause 
controversy and friction, as participants learn by trial-and-error. Risks that would 
normally be avoided become part of a method with scientific authority (Krohn and 
Weyer, 1994). A prominent example is the experimental use of genetically-modified 
crops (GMOs) without conclusive evidence for health and environmental risks. In this 
case ‘the implementation of new technology may become a means to generate exactly 
the knowledge that is supposed to be the basis of such implementation’ (Krohn and 
Van den Daele, 1998, p. 4). 
 Taking a discursive approach, other work in STS emphasizes how real-world 
experiments legitimize technology implementations. With regard to EU agricultural 
policy, Levidow and Carr demonstrate how experimental introductions of GMOs 
allow risks to be scientized and shift to a language of control and measurability 
(Levidow and Carr, 2007). Bonneuil et al. argue that, in GMO controversies, the 
boundaries between laboratory and field are constantly redrawn by participants in the 
debate. Experiments have no intrinsic features; their locations, authorities, methods, 
and topics have always been subject to negotiation (2007). 
The literature on real-world experiments thus informs us about the ways in 
which events take shape around the tension between a desire for control and a 
willingness to take risks. With regard to aggression detection, this can be understood 
as a willingness to risk false detection, illegitimate arrests, or disturbing police 
routines. Yet, we learn little about how objects of intervention are constituted. 
Experimental objects are forgotten in the literature on real-world experiments. 
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 Although one should be careful not to attribute intrinsic qualities to 
experiments and their objects, as Bonneuil et al. suggest, it may be worthwhile to 
question the objects of intervention that this format introduces. Once ‘released’, so 
argue Yuval Millo and Javier Lezaun, objects such as financial options contracts and 
GMOs cannot be withdrawn (2006). They move and mutate in their new 
environments, making their governability a challenge (cf. Callon, 2009). Inquiring 
after the kinds of objects introduced in an aggression detection pilot study therefore is 
relevant, especially since being aggressive is not an offense in itself. In the following, 
I suggest a relational approach to address the operation of real-world experiments. 
 
 
Experiments and Their Objects of Intervention: A Relational Approach 
 
I turn to insights from actor-network theory, material semiotics, and feminist STS to 
understand how aggression was constituted as an object of intervention. Research in 
these fields holds a particular sensitivity to the objects of intervention that are 
constituted in technological practices and the actors that are marginalized in the 
process (Gad and Jensen, 2010). With ‘object of intervention’ these fields refer to the 
entities that come into being through practice. They are ‘done’, and as such, are 
‘simultaneously real, discursive, and social’ (Latour, 1993, p. 64). Such objects range 
from atherosclerosis (Mol, 2002) to forensic race (M'charek, 2013) and illegal 
fisheries (Gad and Lauritsen, 2009). 
 Authors stress the relationality of these objects of intervention. It is argued that 
objects are always being constituted in specific arrangements of humans and things 
(Haraway, 1991; M'charek, 2008; Gad and Lauritsen, 2009). Aggression, for instance, 
is constituted by pulling together collectives of humans and nonhumans at a certain 
place and time, including tools, bodies of knowledge, and regulatory frameworks. 
Therefore, depending on the practice, aggression can be established by psychological 
reports, loud shouting, or the possession of firearms. 
 In a pilot study, the technology needs to be made to work in relation to the 
particularities of the site of practice to produce an object such as aggression. For the 
practice of policy experiments and technology trials, this means that, when a 
technology is introduced in an operational setting, various relations need to be 
reconfigured and aligned (Latour, 1988, 1996; Marres, 2012). This relational 
approach is different than earlier work on real-world experiments. So far, the object of 
intervention has at most been attributed with epistemic variability. In a study about a 
real-world experiment with a waste incinerator, for instance, Krohn argues that in this 
project ‘one of the concerns was to properly define the epistemic object “waste”’ 
(2007, p. 141). This leaves unanswered the question of what comes to qualify as waste 





A focus on how the actors tinker helps to appreciate how objects are constituted in 
trial-and-error situations such as real-world experiments. Karin Knorr-Cetina 
introduced tinkering as a concept to engage with experimenting as a creative, 
material, and ad hoc exercise (1979). Experimenters are tinkerers. They achieve their 
results given the cooperation and contestation of colleagues, opportunities in the field, 
and the materials at hand: 
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They are aware of the material opportunities they encounter at a given place, 
and they exploit them to achieve their projects. At the same time, they 
recognize what is feasible, and adjust or develop their projects accordingly. 
While doing this, they are constantly engaged in producing and reproducing 
some kind of workable object that successfully meets the purpose they have 
temporarily settled on (Knorr-Cetina, 1981, p. 34). 
 
Examples of tinkering in Knorr-Cetina’s work are adjustments of research goals in the 
light of material opportunities and the misuse of laboratory equipment. Consequently, 
research products are ‘multifaceted hybrids’ derived from what was locally available 
and assumed to be significant (1979, pp. 258-259). 
In material semiotic approaches tinkering is discussed in terms of the necessity 
to adjust relations when a technology is applied in a new setting, and frictions and 
disturbances occur (Mol et al., 2010). Changing a wheelchair, for instance, ‘involves 
modulating the relationships and balancing the positions of each member of the 
collective’ (Winance, 2010, p. 112). Following this approach, I refer to tinkering as 
the hands-on work of adjustment in the face of surprises, disturbances, and frictions. I 
diverge from previous work in material semiotics on tinkering by leaving its outcome 
open. In line with Knorr-Cetina’s observations, tinkerers do not always aim for a 
balanced outcome. They may tinker according to their emerging priorities. 
In my analysis of tinkering during the Bus Station S pilot study, I focus on the 
participants’ efforts to tinker with aggression as an acoustic object (for instance, 
shouts or gunshots).3 I identify tinkering in the data as the changes that actors make to 
a technology’s settings, as well as to policies, budgets, and work spaces. In particular, 
I examine the moments when actors tinkered to distinguish foreground and 
background sounds. Foregrounding a sound is to turn it into a signal for action, and 
therefore an object of intervention, in contrast to background noise (Latour and 
Woolgar, 1986). This analysis uses my informants’ understanding of aggression, 
signals, and noises, as I am interested in aggression as an object constituted by their 
activities. 
 To sum up, I suggest a relational approach to understand how a new object of 
intervention is introduced in a real-world experiment. Objects of intervention, such as 
aggression, do not exist on their own; they are made relevant through experimentation 
in terms of their relations in human and non-human collectives. I introduce tinkering 
as a notion through which we can understand how objects are constituted in trial-and-
error processes characteristic of real-world experiments. Studying tinkering, we learn 
about the realignments that constitute aggression at the test site and therefore about 
the nature of this new object. In the case of aggression detection, this refers to whom 
or what identifies aggression, on what basis, and how it can be intervened with. For 
instance, aggression as a physical state is intervened with differently than aggression 
established by a criminal track record. 
This analytical framework enables me to examine how aggression is brought 
into being in a process that includes surprises, friction, and disturbances. At the same 
time, this article shows that not all actors causing surprises and disturbances are 
equally relevant to the detection of aggression. So even though the format of real-
world experimentation is given the capacity to generate more genuine insights into 
local realities, ‘the real world of practice’ (including its disturbances) should not be 
taken for granted (cf. Ingram, 2012). It is both an outcome and an instrumental part of 
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experimenting. To make this argument, I first turn to the case study: the pilot study at 
Bus Station S. 
 
 
Detecting Aggression in the Absence of a ‘Ground Truth’ 
 
Bus Station S 
 
Bus Station S was one of the first pilot studies in the Netherlands to test the acoustic 
detection of aggression in an operational setting. Installed for one year, seven 
microphones detected the sound of vocal aggression. When it was detected, the police 
officers in the nearby control room would first be alerted by the sound of an artificial 
trumpet. Next, the surveillance cameras at Bus Station S would turn to the originating 
location of the sound. Bus Station S would subsequently feed live audio and video 
directly from to the control room for 60 seconds.4 
 The project was initiated and funded by a regional government agency for the 
organization of public transport. This agency asked a local city administration to host 
and manage the pilot study. The host city’s project manager cooperated closely with 
the police station that had installed the technology in its control room. A company that 
I call ‘Analytics Inc.’ provided, installed, and fine-tuned the technology. Bus 
passengers were not told about the use of aggression detection and were therefore not 
actively involved in this pilot study. 
 The regional government’s primary aim was to learn whether sound detection 
could reduce the number of violent incidents and improve the bus drivers’ perception 
of personal security. The host city suggested Bus Station S as the test location because 
it was known as a site where bus drivers and passengers were frequently harassed. In 
my conversations with local police officers, they described the station as ‘old, dark, 
and grimy’, and therefore vulnerable to criminal activity.5 Most of its reputation, 
however, had built up in previous years. Local newspapers, police officers, and 
policymakers suggested that the source of the problem was a nearby nightclub. This 
club, it was assumed, attracted a crowd that often acted under the influence of alcohol 
and drugs. But since the nightclub had closed down, the area had calmed down in the 
eyes of the police. For the city’s project manager, however, Bus Station S was still an 
area of concern. She believed that passengers on their way to other nightlife districts 





Analytics Inc. operates in the field of artificial intelligence. To analyze sounds, it 
applies insights from biology and cognitive science. The company decided to focus on 
the security market when aggression became a central topic of Dutch public debate 
and an issue of increasing importance on corporate and government agendas. 
Measuring aggression, however, is not straightforward. In fact, Analytics Inc.’s 
experts argue in a conference paper6 that there is no absolute scientific measure for 
how much aggression is reflected in a voice. In the following, I first take a closer look 
at the research behind this system. This background will be helpful in understanding 
how the participants in the pilot study tinkered, and what they produced. 
 ‘Ninety percent of all physical violence is preceded by aggressive speech’, so 
Analytics Inc. argued in its sales presentations. In the absence of an absolute 
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definition of aggression, this company claims to have modeled what humans perceive 
as aggressive. From a master’s thesis that did much of the groundwork for this 
technology, we learn that this system is based on a three-step model of human 
perception of emotions through hearing. First, foreground and background sounds are 
separated. Next, the human brain analyzes vocal cues from other persons that ‘betray’ 
aggression. These vocal characteristics ‘attract human attention’. Finally, values are 
assigned to the cues to express the level of aggression: irritation, anger, and rage. 
The cues for the system were determined by applying research that describes 
the production of sounds by humans that attract the human attention. In a state of 
anger or panic, Analytics Inc. argues, high blood pressure and muscular tension affect 
the operation of the vocal chords. Consequently, the voice is marked by aggression. 
To approach these cues, however, the company resorted to studies of the behavior of 
vocal chords when humans raise their voice to attract the attention of others, 
irrespective of their emotional state. These are quantified values of volume, pitch, and 
quality (Analytics Inc. mentions harshness as an example of quality). The machine 
measures these characteristics; it does not analyze the content of the words and 
sentences that it records. 
 Analytics Inc.’s researchers did not consider this model of aggression to set an 
absolute measure. Sounds have a different character in every new environment, they 
argue, and a machine cannot distinguish between a human voice and other sounds on 
its own. This is the ‘signal-to-noise paradox’ (doctoral dissertation; master’s thesis). 
The paradox is that the system needs to correctly analyze a signal, but it can only find 
the signal on the basis of information about what a correct analysis is. Thus, Analytics 
Inc. needs pilot studies to teach the system what constitutes a correct signal, and what 
constitutes background noise for every location. Consequently, as the next section 
demonstrates, aggression as an acoustic object is different for every new location. 
 
 
The Signal of Aggression: Three Sounds 
 
In my discussion of the Bus Station S pilot study, I examine aggression as three 
different acoustic objects at locations belonging to the experimental setting: Analytics 
Inc.’s headquarters, the Department of Community Safety at city hall, and the police 
control room near Bus Station S. For each location, I describe how the actors tinkered 
to constitute aggression as a foreground signal, and how this involved realignments 
between various actors (Winance, 2010). 
 
 
Aggression as Shouts 
 
The first location we visit is Analytics Inc.’s headquarters. Shortly after its installation 
at Bus Station S, the system settings required adjustment because seagulls, ambulance 
sirens, the wind, and heavy engines caused false alarms. I used a fieldwork visit to 
Analytics Inc.’s headquarters and interviews with a researcher and one of the system’s 
developers to learn what tinkering can mean to aggression as an intervention object. 
 Analytics Inc. referred to tinkering as ‘fine-tuning’. Fine-tuning the equipment 
‘is not what I maybe think it is’, one of Analytics Inc.’s researchers told me when I 
visited the company. ‘We don’t go to the location, turn on a switch and immediately 
see the effect.’ Analytics Inc. fine-tunes the technology from its headquarters, far 
removed from Bus Station S. Here, the company receives an audio stream from the 
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on-site installation. This allows it to check the equipment in real-time for false alarms. 
To explain, the researcher pointed to a long list of acoustic-physical variables on a 
computer screen, such as pitch, duration, and energy. This is Analytics Inc.’s coding 
system for aggression. The system operates as a filter that separates what the company 
considers foreground signals from background noises.7 Fine-tuning the system entails 
changing the thresholds of these filters, the values of the variables that trigger an 
alarm. 
The filters’ settings are thus Analytics Inc.’s tools for tinkering with the 
system. Let us first take a closer look at the development of these filters to understand 
what types of foregrounds and backgrounds they distinguish. One of the developers of 
the system started out describing his research by stating that sound is simultaneously 
fascinating and complex, and this is what made his work both trying and intriguing. 
Filters cannot be standardized because the acoustic-physical traits of sounds and the 
meanings we give them vary endlessly, he explains. For example, in terms of pitch 
and energy the sound of an ambulance siren at one hundred meters distance is very 
different than the same sound from ten meters away. Humans know the same object 
produces this sound, but a machine does not. 
A system must thus be taught the precise distinctions between foreground and 
background sounds. The Analytics Inc. research team developed a filter to detect the 
human voice as a foreground signal; the aggression filter that should trigger the alarm. 
A second filter for monotonous noise was added to mark background sounds that 
should not be analyzed as aggression. Despite this filter, the number of false alarms 
remained high. Therefore, the researchers decided to add a third set of filters; what I 
term noise filters. They detect specific common urban background noises, such as 
scooters. Once the noise filters detected a specific sound, it could no longer be marked 
as aggression. 
In my conversations with Analytics Inc.’s experts, they found it difficult to 
describe how exactly the filters are fine-tuned. They said fine-tuning is a ‘special 
skill’ or ‘trick of the trade’ that is particularly hard to explain to outsiders. An expert 
‘sits down with headphones on, changes one of the settings, sees what happens, and 
tries it again’. The researcher continues: 
 
This is our expertise, to learn from, well, if I change these parameters, then 
there’ll be too many false alarms and if I change that one, shut it down, so to 
speak, I’ll get too few alarms. So, you need to find the balance. This is where 
your skill comes in … So, for frequencies, above what level is it interesting? 
Below what does it stop being interesting? And how often should a sound 
happen, before you mark it as aggressive? 
 
Site recordings are played (with) repeatedly to find a balance between false positive 
alarms and false negative alarms (incidents that the system misses). 
What exactly happened to the settings at Bus Station S remains confidential. 
We learn, however, from what did not happen as part of this effort to fine-tune. This 
tells us that Analytics Inc. tinkered with the aggression filter to exclude non-human 
sounds; the engineers focused on the human voice. The point is relevant as Analytics 
Inc. also developed systems to recognize the breaking of glass or gunshots. Moreover, 
as I learned by joining patrolmen on their beat in the area surrounding Bus Station S, 
sounds other than shouts can be a signal of aggression. Some officers, for instance, are 
especially attentive to barking dogs, which were excluded from the system. This made 
the acoustic signal of aggression at Bus Station S exclusively human. 
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 Not only did Analytics Inc. develop a filter that only included the human 
voice, but it also needed to be a loud voice: shouting. Low-voiced threat, for instance, 
was excluded. This can be related back to the technology’s purpose: the detection of 
verbal arguments in nightlife situations. The previous section showed Analytics Inc. 
defined the markers on the basis of research that describes the sounds that people 
make when they aim to attract attention, irrespective of emotional state. The markers 
were thought to function well precisely because the system was not intended to detect 
soft-spoken aggression as this was not considered an indicator of nightlife violence. 
 It should also be noted that a procedure that was part of earlier studies by 
Analytics Inc. was skipped at Bus Station S. Analytics Inc. had previously invited 
their clients, the police for example, to listen to recordings of aggression, and asked 
them to mark the level of aggression on a scale from 1 (requiring immediate action) to 
3 (a false alarm) (conference paper, Analytics Inc.). This means that at Bus Station S, 
Analytics Inc.’s experts had an important role in determining what counted as human 
aggression. 
 Foreground signals and background noises were the outcomes of tinkering 
rather than pre-givens (Latour and Woolgar, 1986). Tinkering involved the inclusion 
of some sounds, at the expense of others. This part of the pilot study was mainly an 
effort to exclude non-human producers of sound, such as dogs, from what was to 
become a signal for aggression. Accordingly, a distinctively human aggression 
became a foreground signal. This was not any kind of human aggression, such as an 
interaction between two persons or a soft-spoken threat. The signal foregrounded by 
Analytics Inc. was a loud fight. As we learned in the previous section, aggression was 
initially conceptualized as the outcome of the physical processes in an aroused body. 
Analytics Inc. translated this knowledge from the field of auditive cognition to a 
notion of aggressors as loud nightlife visitors. 
 
 
Aggression as Bus Horns 
 
A second signal for aggression was suggested in an early phase of the pilot study, as I 
learned from retrospective interviews conducted a few months into the pilot. Here I 
examine the foregrounding and backgrounding of this second signal to understand the 
realignments the city’s Department of Community Safety made through tinkering. 
To mark the formal start of the pilot study, Analytics Inc. demonstrated the 
system at Bus Station S and in the police control room. Normally, the bus companies 
were not consulted, but, for this occasion, a few staff members were invited to witness 
the operation of the system. During the demonstration, they sat in the police control 
room where they saw and heard how recordings of aggressive shouting that Analytics 
Inc.’s employees played on the bus platform triggered the system. One of the bus 
company's staff pointed out a problem after the demonstration. As he put it: 
 
The system only works when people argue with shouting or fighting on the 
platform. But what if something happens on the bus? The system does not 
notice that. Then how can the driver attract attention? 
 
He then asked the city’s project manager: would it be possible for the alarm to be 
triggered by the bus horn? Among the bus drivers in this region, the horn is a well-
known signal of distress, he told her. To blow the horn three times means you are in 
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trouble and need the assistance of other bus drivers. He suggested that this could be a 
signal for acoustic detection. 
 The city’s project manager thought the suggestion was interesting, so she 
asked Analytics Inc. for a quote. Modeling the bus horn did indeed seem possible to 
Analytics Inc. It had developed filters to detect mechanical sounds before, such as 
gunshots. Horns were already part of the noise filter, but the filter could be adjusted to 
mark three consecutive blows as a signal of aggression. Thus, instead of background 
noise, the bus horn would be a foreground signal. 
However, when Analytics Inc. returned with a price estimate, the city’s project 
manager felt that the cost was too high. There was a limit to the amount of money she 
could spend on innovations to benefit the private sector (Dutch regional bus services 
were privatized in 2000). This was not just a decision about financial responsibilities 
in crime control but also about who would intervene with aggression. If a bus driver 
uses the horn, it means there would be other drivers in the vicinity, the project 
manager argued. In such cases, drivers should first attempt to solve the problem 
among themselves. ‘We [project manager and bus company’s staff member] talked 
about it, and if you use the horn, there are buses nearby. So maybe your colleagues 
can help you.’ 
The project manager’s actions can be understood as tinkering a signal to the 
background. Were the sound detection system to detect a bus horn as aggression, this 
would mean that misbehavior would not be constituted just by knowledge of 
cognitive-physical processes in the human body. Instead, what the bus drivers 
experience as aggression would lead to an alarm. However, the bus horn was excluded 
from the order of intervention at Bus Station S. This positioned aggression as a set of 
acoustic-physical variables produced by an aggressor at the core of the order of 
intervention enacted by the city at that moment. 
Accordingly, tinkering not only involved Analytics Inc.’s employees fiddling 
with the settings of the sound filters. It also included ‘modulating the relationships 
and balancing the positions of each member of the collective’ (Winance, 2010, p. 
112). If the bus horn were deemed a signal of intervention, it would establish a direct 
relation between the driver inside the bus and the local police control room. This 
relation did not exist as yet, as bus companies were held responsible for maintaining 
order on their own terrain. Buses were equipped with a distress button that connects 
them to the bus companies’ control room, from where the police can be contacted. 
The buses and bus platforms, however, were the property and responsibility of the bus 
companies. Excluding the bus horn as a signal of intervention therefore re-established 
intervention inside the bus as the drivers’ responsibility. 
 
 
Aggression as Sirens/Silence 
 
The last acoustic object I discuss is the siren. It caused numerous false alarms in the 
police control room. In this section, I use observations of everyday practices in the 
control room and interviews with police officers to show how the officers tinkered 
with acoustic space, including the sound detection system, to manage these false 
alarms. 
 The control room is the operational center for the orchestration of police 
action in the district. It is where police reports about incidents reach the station by 
phone, portophone (walkie-talkie), and digital messaging. The control room operators 
emphasized that their main responsibility is to care for their colleagues on patrol: ‘We 
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are our colleagues’ security,’ said one operator. ‘You always need to be alert to help 
them.’ 
 This became evident in their daily activities. From the control room, the 
officers arranged for backup if necessary. They also provided patrolmen with 
information about individuals living at an address and about the histories of vehicles 
and their owners. Before a patrolman made a house call, his or her control room 
colleagues checked for previous offenses, possession of firearms, and previous 
confrontations with the police. ‘If we know an aggressive person lives at that address 
we can tell them [patrolmen] to take a car with them,’ an operator explained. 
During the pilot study, the control room operators tinkered to manage a sound 
that was unintentionally marked as aggression: the sirens of emergency vehicles. Bus 
Station S is located on a road to a hospital and a fire station, so sirens triggered at least 
one false alarm each day. This problem could not be solved by Analytics Inc. The 
company argues in a conference paper that the acoustic-physical characteristics of a 
siren are similar to those of an aggressive voice; ironically, both attract human 
attention. A siren of a passing ambulance will therefore generate an alarm. The sirens 
could not be sifted out with a separate noise filter, one of the system’s developers 
explained in an interview, because by sifting out sirens, vocal aggression would also 
be sifted out. The latter could thus be recorded without triggering an alarm, and this 
was a risk that Analytics Inc. was not willing to take. 
To cope with the false alarms, the police officers tinkered with the sound 
detection system. This was done in the context of the everyday operations of adjusting 
the acoustic space. To make clear how this is relevant, I first describe the role of 
sound in the daily operations of this police control room. In this environment, 
policemen use sound to distinguish relevant signals. They can do so because they are 
trained listeners. A regular officer can do an interview, listen to his or her colleagues, 
and tune into a portophone call all at the same time. In the control room, operators 
listen for computer bleeps that report incidents. Also, they have learned to extricate 
relevant messages from an uninterrupted flow of spoken portophone calls by listening 
for regional codes. Another way of assigning relevance is to judge the level of panic 
or distress in the voices of their colleagues on the phone. Sometimes it is very clear 
that a patrolman is in trouble because he or she will use the phrase for emergencies, 
‘assistentie, collega’ (‘help colleague’). However, a policeman who has just joined 
the force, an operator claimed, might sound panicky for no reason, so ‘you have to 
know who you are talking to.’ 
Whenever I visited the control room, the officers incessantly adjusted the 
various technologies that transmit audio. The operators did this to manage their 
individual attention to calls. For instance, some officers turned the volume of 
incoming portophone messages up and down several times during a shift. If a phone 
call or portophone message was inaudible, the patrolman on the other end of the line 
was asked to move position or to clear the line. Also, the television and radio were 
often on, but at times an operator would decide to lower the volume. An officer 
explained, ‘Some colleagues leave the TV on all day, but I can’t do that anymore.’ 
She meant that her hearing had become less sharp over the years. In addition, the 
operators managed the physical connection of the control room to other parts of the 
police station. They closed and opened the doors and windows according to the level 
of disturbance from the outside world. 
Coming back to aggression detection, in this environment, at first the 
loudspeakers that transmitted the aggression alarm were kept in the basement of the 
police station. The control room manager was worried by the disturbance false alarms 
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could cause. After six months, they decided to place the speakers in the control room. 
‘Here’s hoping for the best,’ the control room manager said shortly after the speakers 
were installed, ‘but it’s a pilot study, and we need to try.’ 
Once installed in the control room, false aggression alarms transmitted the 
sound of sirens that triggered the alarm. This was especially disturbing if an 
emergency vehicle was heading to an accident close by because it required the 
operators’ full attention. The police reacted to false alarms by lowering the volume or 
disconnecting the speaker wires. At the start of a new working day, the volume was 
turned up again or the wires were reconnected. After a couple of months, however, the 
effort to reconnect the technology stopped. Starting out as an unintentional foreground 
signal in the control room, ultimately the sound detection system was silenced. 
 The operational domain of the pilot study thus demonstrates another way in 
which people tinker: by regulating acoustic space. The police officers tinkered with 
the system to make sure that operations in the control room ran smoothly. Thereby 
they re-established the existing order of intervention, accompanied by acoustic signals 
such as computer bleeps in the control room. 
By tinkering with aggression detection the officers foregrounded aggression as 
a different sound object than Analytics Inc. had introduced. They established 
aggression in the control room on the basis of the experience of officers on patrol, 
identifiable by their voice or by the computer bleeps of the digital messaging system. 
In addition, records of previous offenses were drawn together to establish a risk of 
aggression. Whereas Analytics Inc. located aggression in the body of the supposed 
aggressor, the control room operators located aggression in records of previous events 
and the experience of their colleagues. 
Tinkering thus involved establishing different relations. In line with Knorr-
Cetina’s findings, tinkering was done in line with the actors’ (emerging) priorities 
(1979, 1981). In this case, the officers in the control room reset their priority to care 
for their colleagues on patrol, thereby negating the direct link between the 
microphones at Bus Station S and the police control room. Furthermore, the officers 
on the street and in the control room were reconstituted as the authorities for 
establishing aggression. Silencing the detection system also reinstated the temporality 
of control room practices. If possible, the operators informed patrolmen about 
individuals, households, and vehicles at least five minutes before they approached 
them to make sure they were prepared. Sound detection, on the other hand, was 
communicated by live recordings on-site. Accordingly, police officers were expected 
to respond to an alarm when aggression was supposedly already happening. 
The enactment of a local work order based on other acoustic signals eventually 
silenced the detection system. Nevertheless, Acoustic Inc.’s aggression was not 
subdued entirely, as I suggest in the next section. 
 
 
The Aggression Moment 
 
Something else is worth noting about the police’s tinkering in the control room. Three 
months after the formal start of the pilot study, the control room manager began 
expressing his disappointment in the performance of the technology, and he did so 
repeatedly on my following visits. Surprisingly, the police carried on tinkering with 
the acoustic space. They decided to move the speakers from the basement to the 
control room, and for several months after repeatedly reconnected the wires after 
disconnecting them. Why reconnect speakers when the sound of aggression detection 
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disturbed the control room operators? As argued above, the police tinkered to retain 
their work practices. Yet, it seems like tinkering served another purpose as well. 
 Connecting and reconnecting the system seemed to be aimed at generating 
false alarms that demonstrated failure.8 Yet, this was not taken to be a failure of the 
technology. Instead, the location was performed as an erratic and uncontrollable 
reality. We read this in the evaluation report based on the police’s experience with 
aggression detection. After one year of testing, the evaluation committee stated that 
the device had not detected aggressive behavior in the trial period.9 The ensuing 
evaluation report was brief on the outcome: ‘aggression detection does not work on 
this busy road with buses, emergency services, and other sources of sound. The 
evaluation report attributed the problem of false alarms not to the technology, but to 
the location. In particular, it was attributed to local actors that produce noise. 
 Thus, tinkering characterized the location as noisy, unpredictable, and 
uncontrollable. This is in contrast to the potential performance of the location of 
practice as predictable, routine, and controllable.10 It had two advantages for the 
police. First, they could argue that the technology needed to be removed from this 
site. Second, they did not need to discuss the technology itself in detail to make this 
argument. 
 By suggesting that the test site disturbed the detection of aggression, the actors 
separated the object of aggression from the site. In other words, aggression was 
constituted as a detectable object (just not at Bus Station S). This allowed the city to 
consider testing this technology at another location. Furthermore, it allowed Analytics 
Inc. to specialize in indoor locations, making outdoor sounds a disturbance to 
detecting the fact of aggression. 
Therefore, aggression as a trait of an aroused body translated into a set of 
acoustic-physical variables was left uncontested, even if the technology produced 
false alarms. In fact, Analytics Inc.’s aggression became part of the parlance of the 
policy makers and the police. In the evaluation meetings and in interviews after the 
pilot study, policy makers and police spoke of ‘an aggression’ as a discrete, 
measurable moment. One of the policy officers of the city described the technology’s 
future operation as ‘when the camera turns to an aggression moment, a police officer 





I began this article with the following problem: real-world experiments that test new 
technologies can affect policy and practice by introducing new objects of intervention. 
This raises practical and ethical concerns, as a focus on potential technological 
advantages can overshadow careful scrutiny of the objects, policies and practices 
introduced through experimenting. We should therefore ask how objects of 
intervention attain their nature in real-world experiments. The aggression detection 
pilot study helps answer this question as it introduced acoustic aggression as an object 
of intervention. The Dutch criminal code does not forbid ‘aggressive’ speech and 
behavior, yet in this case a technology was introduced that reported aggression to the 
police. At stake, therefore, were the emotions one is allowed to express in public 
space, the authorities deciding over this and the method of intervention. 
 In real-world experiments, objects of intervention attain their nature through 
tinkering. This article discussed three acoustic signals of aggression established by the 
tinkering activities of engineers, policymakers, and police officers. The object of 
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aggression introduced by Analytics Inc. was a shout produced by the aroused human 
body, in particular that of the nightlife visitor. But in city hall, aggression also took on 
the form of bus horns activated by threatened bus drivers. In the police control room, 
phone conversations and computer bleeps notified police officers of risky persons and 
situations. 
 The participants tinkered by adjusting the aggression detection device, roles in 
crime control, and the acoustic space of the control room. Tinkering, this case study 
shows, is a relational effort with the effect of including some actors, while 
marginalizing others. At the offices of Analytics Inc., foregrounding aggression as 
shouts required excluding mechanical and animal sounds as indicators of aggression. 
At the city’s Department of Community Safety, the police’s involvement with the bus 
drivers’ experience of aggression was cut short by discarding the bus horn as a signal 
of aggression. In the control room, police officers tinkered to silence the aggression 
detection alarm. Thus, they foregrounded the messages of fellow patrolmen, and 
backgrounded the events at Bus Station S. 
 Tinkering at the police control room was not only a matter of realigning work 
practices. The aggression detection system in the control room was repeatedly 
connected and disconnected to demonstrate the number of false alarms generated. 
These were not attributed to the technology or the signals of aggression that it 
foregrounded, but to the noisiness of the test site. Thereby, the test site was disproved, 
not Analytics Inc.’s aggression (aggression as shouts produced by an aroused body) as 
an object of police intervention. 
 To conclude, a relational approach to real-world experiments firstly shows that 
a technology experiment can introduce objects for intervention. Focusing on the 
relational aspects of tinkering allowed me to study the nature of these new objects; 
who determines what they are, by which method, and what or who is excluded. 
Aggression was shifted in and out of the human body, depending on the technology 
and knowledge applied. Even though the technology’s developers started out with a 
notion of aggression as a receiver’s bodily experience, Analytics Inc. put in practice 
aggression as shouts produced by the bodies of nightlife visitors. Despite the fact that 
this object was tinkered away in the control room, it continued to exist as an 
‘aggression moment’ in the policy realm. The pilot study therefore introduced a norm 
for behavior not prescribed by criminal law, but by the acoustic-physical variables 
understood to represent bodily aggression. 
Secondly, this approach made it possible to critically engage with the format 
of experimenting at a location of practice. The pilot study format is credited with the 
production of knowledge that reflects the ‘actual’ performance of a technology. Yet, 
in tinkering processes, actors and events at the pilot study location are only selectively 
made relevant. Dogs and bus drivers were disturbing uninvited guests, instead of 
actors to be included in an aggression alarm. 
The overarching contribution of this article to studies of real-world 
experiments is that what counts as the real world cannot be taken for granted. 
Matthias Gross heads in this direction when he argues that in experimental projects 
outside the laboratory events are only surprising in the light of (reconstructed) 
expectations (2010). The argument made here is slightly different. Pilot studies, trials, 
and tests are formats which produce particular accounts of reality together with 
accounts of technology. A relational focus on tinkering shows that, in each real-world 
experiment, the site of implementation would be made relevant differently. The case 
of aggression detection demonstrates that how exactly the ‘real world’ is made 
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relevant needs to be considered as it has an effect on the truth status of the introduced 





1Fictitious names guarantee the anonymity of my informants, with the exception 
of the Dutch Data Protection Authority (Dutch DPA). 
2See, for instance, Gates (2010); Boyle and Haggerty (2009); and Helten and 
Fischer (2004). 
3The material production and consumption of sound is the focus of the social 
studies of sound (Pinch and Bijsterveld, 2012). This field has a particular interest 
in the materiality of sound, and its embeddedness in society, science, and 
technology (Pinch and Bijsterveld, 2004). Authors in this field have shown the 
role of sound practices in the shaping of subcultures and identities (Waksman, 
2004), and demonstrated that ‘sounds are places where power relations are 
managed, elaborated and acted out’ (Sterne, 2003, p. 59). This body of work has 
not, however, explicitly addressed the bringing into being of acoustic objects in 
material semiotic terms. I turn to other STS literatures to describe how aggression 
is established as an acoustic object. I should mention here that some authors’ 
work does point in this direction. For instance, Mody (2005) shows how sounds 
are part of the organization of laboratory work. Lachmund (1999) examines how 
lung sound codification systems are variably constituted in different countries. 
4The Dutch DPA contended that no privacy regulations were violated. It allowed 
these practices because Analytics Inc. claimed that it did not save recordings 
beyond the ‘purposes of the experiment’, and because the content of words and 
sentences was not analyzed (letter, Dutch DPA 2005). 
5All quotes are translated from Dutch by the author. 
6Citing the full titles of the research literature and policy documents that I quote 
or reference in this article could reveal the names of individuals, locations, or 
organizations. I have therefore chosen to mention only the document types in the 
text, and exclude those references from the bibliography. 
7I follow my informants’ terminology in referring to codification systems as 
filters. 
8The demonstration function of experiments is well described in STS. See, for 
instance, Shapin and Schaffer (1985), Latour (1988), Barry (2001), Simakova 
(2010). Whereas most of these accounts demonstrate success, in this case the 
actors seem to demonstrate failure. 
9Here I do not discuss the technology’s performance in terms of missed and 
detected cases of aggression because the police do not register all cases of verbal 
and physical violence. 
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